Digitalization of COVID-19 pandemic management and cyber risk from
  connected systems by Radanliev, Petar et al.
Published in IEEE internet of things  
News May 2020: https://iot.ieee.org/newsletter/may-2020/digitalization-of-covid-19-
pandemic-management-and-cyber-risk-from-connected-systems  
  
Digitalization of COVID-19 pandemic management and cyber risk 
from connected systems 
Petar Radanliev, David De Roure, Max Van Kleek 
What makes cyber risks arising from connected systems challenging during the management of a 
pandemic? Assuming that a variety of cyber-physical systems are already operational-collecting, 
analyzing, and acting on data autonomously-what risks might arise in their application to pandemic 
management? We already have these systems operational, collecting, and analyzing data 
autonomously, so how would a pandemic monitoring app be different or riskier? 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the answer to these questions depends on specific aspects of the design and 
deployment of the connected systems in question. If established security design rules are followed, 
and focus is placed on what is required for pandemic management, this risks will be minimized. If, 
however, due to time and resource pressure such as from an unfolding pandemic, security is ignored 
for practicality and speed, new systems could be more easily compromised, leading to the potential 
for later system failures at crucial times. If such systems are designed and operated in the first wave 
of a global pandemic such as COVID-19, during the second and subsequent waves of system failure 
could lead to unnecessary loss of lives. We outline the security design principles that would minimize 
the potential risk scenarios.  
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the focus on stringent personal data protection for preserving 
individual privacy has been made more complicated by the need to support public health efforts 
that necessitate some degree of global surveillance assisted with new digital technologies. This 
brings into attention Internet of Things (IoT) technologies for their ability to operate autonomously 
to collect, analyse, and share data about the physical environment, which makes them essential 
elements in the digitalization of pandemic management. The IoT represents technologies that can 
use sensors for detection, gather and analyze information, create meaningful insights and act. The 
action usually represents a tailored product or service or improves the efficiency of operational 
processes. One difference between the IoT and the Internet is that the IoT can be completely 
automated and autonomous; in contrast, the Internet is fundamentally designed for application that 
connect people. With IoT technologies, the role of humans as actors in the network is arguably 
diminished. Automated and autonomous IoT technologies trigger questions on the potential cyber 
risk arising from the integration of artificial intelligence and machine learning in the IoT network. We 
review how artificial intelligence and machine learning can enable pandemic management, while 
ethically assessing the cyber risk from increased deregulation of data standards in IoT devices and 
networks.  
What is IoT risk? 
The emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) in the late 1990s presented a new and fast-evolving 
technology that was characterized by low cost-high value per unit to a world that was unprepared to 
assess the associated risks. Since its emergence, IoT risks have been measured with traditional risk 
assessment methodologies and frameworks. One problem with such assessments during global 
pandemics is that IoT presents very different types of risks than the traditional Internet. Thus, an 
essential step to make sense of IoT risks is to understand IoT risk vectors [1]. One risk vector is that 
IoT, unlike the Internet, does not necessarily require human intervention [2]. IoT products can use 
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connected sensors to collect and analyze data, then aggregate data or present data in various 
formats and trigger further actions based on data interpretation processes. The main question is, if 
interested parties acquire access to big data collected from individuals during a pandemic, what 
further actions could be triggered based on the aggregated new data, or even just from the 
interpretations of the new data?  
A second risk vector is represented by the multiple and diverse connection points used to access any 
given IoT ecosystem, e.g. door locks connected to home security systems, or smart home hubs that 
collect personal and sensitive data via the devices they're connected to. Since the rapid spread of IoT 
devices is partially triggered by the low cost of materials, production, installation, automated data 
collection and analysis, one could argue that one of the main strengths of IoT is represented by the 
low cost and the relative ease in the deployment of this technology. However, securing IoT devices 
and assuring a level of maintenance on a par with other critical systems, such as typical of the 
telecom industry, for example, would require an increase in the initial cost for production and 
deployment and possibly a significant one in the operational costs. This increase in cost could 
diminish the main competitive edge of IoT devices.  Also, in complex IoT ecosystems, it can be 
difficult to find truly independent risks and to establish an actual correlation between pertinent risks 
[3]. Given the low cost of IoT devices, risk managing the complex coupled IoT systems has proven 
challenging even before the pandemic. Therefore, the focus must be on enabling data collection for 
pandemic risk management, while simultaneously limiting the aggregation of personal data that 
could be used for alternative interpretations.  
Value of IoT in pandemic management 
Despite the emerging IoT risks and the incomplete understanding of the impact created by these 
new risks, it is the value of IoT infrastructure in pandemic management and the promises for 
optimization of existing pandemic monitoring costs that drive governments to accept unknown risks 
and technological challenges. On a set of virtually no global IoT risk standards and policies, we 
anticipate further fragmentation of the IoT ecosystems, in which risk assessment models are likely to 
be volatile, vendor dependent, and less transparent [4]. Some of the advantages of the foreseen 
increase in heterogeneity consist of opportunities through competitive innovation. However, 
innovation in the IoT space implies important variations and unknowns concerning critical aspects 
such as security, adoption, and implementation of different sorts of rights, such as the right to 
privacy. 
These issues can be partly solved through insurance and reinsurance. There are already insurer 
companies that not only cover specific IoT risks considered at different operational levels, but more 
broadly the cascading effects generated by the cyber-physical nature of IoT infrastructure that can 
span across vast geographical areas and interact with the physical environment and various logical 
functions. In terms of pandemic management, there is also a value for medical business models. 
Some insurance companies cover the business aspects because they can distribute the risks across 
their portfolio in ways that allow a further decrease in average loss values. But given the speed of 
COVID-19 pandemic, it is unclear how fast can insurers adapt to the new risks. Many insurers simply 
back away with concerns of significant unpredicted and unmanageable losses.  
Why is the risk of connected devices difficult to assess? 
The risk from coupled and connected systems in pandemic management presents challenges in 
autonomous medical data collection, storing, processing and analysis. Here, we outline some of the 
inherent challenges in pandemic monitoring though coupled and connected systems. 
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• Difficulties in assessing cyber risk: The installation of new low-cost connected devices and 
sensors is, in some instances, not considered an IT or medical function. Connected devices 
and sensors serve a very diverse set of functions, ranging from simple automation such as 
room occupancy motion sensors for switching on the lights, to vastly more complex 
automation such as thermally regulating a building or ensuring its security.  Installation of 
such sensors could be an operational task performed by the buildings and maintenance 
teams. Hence, in some instances, cyber risk from connected devices is invisible to cyber risk 
managers. Another example is retrofitting where IoT solutions are implemented on existing 
legacy systems. The justification for retrofitting is to reduce the cost of implementing new 
technologies. Also, since IoT evolves so fast, retrofitting is also justified to reduce the cost of 
new IoT technologies that are quickly becoming obsolete. But this creates security problems. 
Old legacy systems are based on older security programs, sometimes working with simple 
and often shared passwords and system accounts that are easy to breach. In this context, 
IoT technology, and digitalization in general, provides solutions and extend well beyond for 
the existing legacy systems to manufacturing floors and other production activities and 
consumers. The logical assumption is that connected devices dealing with biosensed or 
medical data for public health during a pandemic would face similar, if not greater, 
difficulties. Yet the potential benefits are immense; there are many examples from around 
the world on how existing medical information systems can be extended and enhanced 
through connected devices, including automatic diagnosis1 for conditions unrelated to 
COVID-19; monitoring and supervision with live tracking systems2; or even virtual clinics3. 
One could argue that the real value of digitalization in medical systems depends largely on a 
strong correlation between cybersecurity and innovation. Global data governance is 
struggling to keep up with the fast evolution, especially in IoT cyber risks from non-
traditional data, such as facial recognition data, facilities access data, and industrial control 
system data. However, such systems are already in place and operational in many countries. 
Currently, such systems are used for security reasons, and it is hard to see how it would be 
any different if the same system is used for pandemic management. The main reasonable 
concern seems to be the new information that could emerge from analyzing medical data 
collected for pandemic management, with deep learning and artificial intelligence 
algorithms.  
• Difficulties in assessing cyber risk from feeding medical data to deep learning and artificial 
intelligence algorithms: The difficulties in identifying the risk from deep learning and 
artificial intelligence (AI) emerge from the limitations of such assessments on existing non-
medical systems. The proposed digitalization in medical systems can also be seen as a 
dynamic automated predictive cognitive system supported by real-time intelligence for 
cyber medical analytics. This requires dynamic analytics of cyber-attack threat event 
frequencies to predict the cyber risk magnitudes of medical data loss, and/or alternative 
interpretations of the medical data. Despite the requirements for a predictive model built 
upon mathematical and statistical methods, there are currently no mathematical models 
that enable the quantitative assessment of cyber risk in any sector, including the medical 
sector. In our recent publication on this topic [5], we discovered that the lack of probabilistic 
data leads to qualitative cyber risk assessment approaches, where the outcome represents a 
speculative assumption [6]. Emerging quantitative models are effectively designed with 
ranges and confidence intervals based on expert opinions, and not probabilistic data [7]. 
                                                        
1 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6510889/ 
2 https://coronaboard.kr/en/ 
3 https://www.mobihealthnews.com/news/asia-pacific/ping-good-doctor-launches-commercial-operation-one-
minute-clinics-china 
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However, quantitative risk impact estimation is needed for making decisions on topics such 
as estimating cybersecurity, cyber risk, and cyber insurance.  Without a dynamic, real-time 
probabilistic risk data and cyber risk analytics enhanced with AI, these estimations can be 
outdated and imprecise. Hence, the impact of cyber risk on digital medical systems could be 
costly, and cybersecurity not necessarily effective. The value of cyber risk real-time data in 
non-medical systems can be explained in economic terms, where the level of cybersecurity 
is based on economic value. In medical systems, economic value is not the primary concern; 
instead, the focus is on the patient’s safety and privacy. Therefore, even in times of 
pandemics, the AI integration in the communications network and the relevant 
cybersecurity technology must evolve in an ethical way that humans can understand, while 
maintaining the maximum trust and privacy of the users. The co-ordination of cyber 
protection and AI analytics of personal data from connected devices must be reliable to 
prevent abuse from insider threats, organized crime, terror organizations, or state-
sponsored aggressors. Given the lack of assessment on data privacy in existing medical 
systems for pandemic management, we could drive a comparison from the private sector. 
Data risk has been encouraging the private sector to take steps to improve the management 
of confidential and proprietary information (i.e. customer or financial data), intellectual 
property, and PII (Personally Identifiable Information). Companies that are interested in 
obtaining new revenue streams from data have pursued innovative and cost-effective ways 
to protect such data. Therefore, the digitalization of medical systems needs to be designed 
similarly as the private sector has been in recent times. One additional level of security that 
needs to be anticipated that could evolve from such a new system is the analysis of the 
threat event frequency, with a dynamic and self-adapting AI. This would empower the 
design of a cognition engine mechanism for predicting the data loss magnitude through the 
control, analysis, distribution, and management of probabilistic data. While this would 
enhance the security of digital medical systems, it would also help future efforts by 
governments and the private sector to improve the management of confidential and 
proprietary information.  
• Cyber risk standards on data risk from connected devices: Despite many efforts, there are 
no uniform standards governing data risk from connected devices. It is unlikely that such 
uniform standards can be developed on time for COVID-19 pandemic management. There 
are discussions on this topic and in the future, we can certainly expect such standards. 
However, this could be years ahead, while the current IoT operating model is based on 
shared responsibility. Given the rapid growth of the IoT shared ecosystem and the lack of 
guidance, businesses have already started building and applying their standards and 
protocols. The digitalization of medical systems for pandemic management could follow 
existing standards and protocols developed by the business community. The potential 
negative implications of such developments could hinder the value of autonomous data 
sharing by connected devices. One of the main strengths of IoT in global pandemic 
management is the ability to aggregate data from different sources and in different formats 
and connect to various networks using different protocols. The lack of common, unified, and 
global standards governing the IoT, creates significant barriers to the interoperability of 
connected devices in sharing medical data.  
• Security paradigms for connected devices in pandemic management: Traditionally, 
cybersecurity has been separated into three paradigms, secure, vigilant, and resilient. The 
secure paradigm is focused on preventing certain risks from occurring. In terms of digital 
pandemic management, prevention must include multi-layered protection in the form of 
coupled systems. Coupled systems increase protection from invisible weaknesses, such as 
different interpretation of collected data. The vigilance paradigm refers to securing a digital 
pandemic management system in a method that can resist attacks over time. With the IoT 
technologies continuously evolving, it is not enough to simply have a security strategy digital 
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pandemic management. Since the threats are changing, the strategy should also be 
changing. Thirdly, resiliency refers to how quickly the recovery process can enable normal 
operations of the system. This capability is essential for designing digital systems for 
pandemic management systems, in the context in which the first two paradigms, security, 
and vigilance, cannot guarantee that some form of failure would not occur.  
• Risk management of connected devices in pandemic management: With connected devices 
speeding into the medical system during pandemic management, there is an urgent need for 
digital security officers that would oversee the increasingly connected critical infrastructure, 
data production processes, and smart data analytics. When considering the risk assessment 
approaches discussed so far, it becomes clear that the increase in medical data connectivity 
implies higher risks. Reducing open connections reduces cyber risk. But the IoT is a solution 
based on multiple connections. Although the open connections are anonymized, they still 
increase the attack surface. This creates a conflict between value and risk. However, there 
are methods to mitigate this situation, such as building security in the design process [8], 
known as Secure by Design principles4, or considering how security is handled by the device 
across its lifetime and possible varying contexts of use, known as Security Ergonomics by 
Design principles [9].  Security considerations need to be applied early in the design 
development process. To secure IoT devices early in the design development process 
requires an increase in the cost of manufacturing (e.g. secure by default), production (e.g. 
secure by design), installation (e.g. secure by resilience), and maintenance (e.g. security 
updates). Such costs, unless applied through some form of unified and global standards, can 
hinder the competitiveness of the IoT in a digital medical system on a national level. Many 
non-medical industries require that expensive risk engineering assessment should be done 
throughout the entire lifecycle of the product. The digitalization of pandemic management 
needs to follow a similar approach. Since time is of the essence during pandemics, one 
solution would be to only use connected devices that are secure by default, design, 
resilience, and enabled for security updates. This would, however, limit the value of 
connected devices in pandemic management. Hence, the solutions could be found in the 
two-level system, where data from less secured devices is anonymized, and only used for a 
limited function.  
• The simple solution for data from less secured connected devices: To safeguard from the 
‘invisible’ IoT cyber risks, an integrated approach to cybersecurity is required in the 
digitalization of pandemic management. Decentralized security fails to assess how IoT 
connects operations in unexpected ways. The scale and scope of IoT data collected are often 
underestimated, including the risks from such data being assessed by third parties, which is 
often the case. In contrast, an integrated approach to security (e.g. ISA 3000) would assure 
that most IoT risks could be prevented before they even occur. Another relatively simple 
solution is to integrate operational capabilities with multi-layered cyber risk management. 
This could take the form of loosely coupled pandemic management systems. Such an 
approach can reduce the risk of widespread failure triggered by a single device. To prevent 
risk from retrofitting, with the rise of new technologies and new threats, the legacy systems 
will soon become incapable to be upgraded with the newest security that prevents new 
threats. It seems that the innovation process will resolve this category of cyber risk because 
it will simplify compliance and address specific operational technology need. In terms of 
resilience, a simple solution would be to create a fail-safe system. In such a system, 
malicious artificial intelligence though IoT devices could create a denial of service by 
                                                        
4https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/775559/Secu
re_by_Design_Report_.pdf 
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themselves5 and a failure in one element can disrupt the entire pandemic management 
system. 
Final remarks 
The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in different countries developing digital surveillance 
approaches for pandemic management, some of which operating autonomously to collect, analyze, 
and share data. Currently, the digitalization of COVID-19 pandemic management is occurring at a 
fast rate across the globe, with the integration of automated and autonomous connected devices 
feeding real-time data to artificial intelligence algorithms. While the digitalization of medical systems 
presents strong value for pandemic management, efforts need to be focused on solutions that 
deliver value for pandemic management, and not on designing systems that expose personal data to 
cyber risk and could make things worst. There are safe and ethical ways of using artificial intelligence 
algorithms and data from connected devices for pandemic management. But the design of digital 
systems for pandemic management, need to anticipate that connected devices create new 
unpredictable and often invisible cyber risks that are currently unregulated and frequently ignored. 
Considering that these are new technologies that are evolving at a very fast rate, almost every new 
design a digital pandemic monitoring system can be classified as high risk. Many such digitalization 
approaches seem to be threading in uncertain waters (e.g. China), taking risks without fully 
understanding the impact, and operating with a rather hopeful strategy. Also, there is a lack of 
appropriate cyber insurance policies to transfer risk and the lack of standards and regulations to 
govern these new medical systems. Given these conditions, the separation of risks becomes urgent. 
With the appropriate separation of systems according to the potential risks, at least the medical 
professionals could keep parts of the pandemic management system operational during cyber-
attacks, or during data privacy loss. As things stand at present, many digital pandemic management 
systems are driven by the monitoring opportunities and treatment potential. This leads to a scenario 
where developers of such systems can ignore threats, continue to chase opportunities and hope for 
the best, but that won’t stop hackers exploit their opportunities, and interfering along the process.  
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